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FROM MUELLER TO MILLER: DETERMINING STANDARDS FOR DECISIONS 
REGARDING CRITICALLY ILL NEWBORNS. Tanaz Farzan Danialifar (Sponsored 
by Geoffrey Miller). Section of Neurology, Department of Pediatrics, Yale University, 
School of Medicine, New Haven, CT. 
The controversy surrounding selective nontreatment of critically ill newborns has been 
ongoing for over three decades.  Since ancient times ill, premature, or deformed infants 
have been treated discriminatorily, and infanticide has been a historically acceptable 
practice.  With medical, moral, and legal progress, infanticide has disappeared and been 
replaced with selective nontreatment.  This raises new ethical concerns such as best 
interests, quality of life, wrongful life, and parental autonomy; and legal questions 
regarding medical neglect, privacy, discrimination, and the limits of the Federal 
Government. Through an examination of relevant medical and legal literature, mass 
media publications, and both state and federal court decisions, this paper will provide a 
historical overview of the development of the ethical and legal principles guiding 
neonatal decision-making.  In addition to a review of the historical contexts for treatment 
decisions regarding vulnerable infants, a discussion of several landmark medical-legal 
cases will establish the current standards for neonatal decision-making.  This historical 
overview reveals the shortcomings of past and current legislation and the dissonance 
between current practice, public opinion, and the law.
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In 1978 Maria Piers wrote, “Nowadays we universally condemn practices such as 
infanticide, incidental and specific abuse, and the torture of infanticidal mothers; and 
most importantly, today there is universal agreement that every child born has the right to 
live. This is a new idea. A true achievement of this century,”(1).  Piers highlights the 
drastic changes in treatment of infants since historic times; however, what is perhaps 
more significant are the developments in attitudes and legislation that affect current 
neonatology practice.  With continued medical advancements and the ability to save the 
youngest and sickest newborns, come new bioethical and legal questions concerning best 
interests, quality of life, parental autonomy, and the role of the government in medical 
decision-making.  In this thesis I will discuss the development of pediatric medical ethics 
with regards to selective nontreatment of critically ill and premature infants.  The 
approach will include a brief historical overview of approaches towards imperiled 
newborns and a review of the development of modern neonatology.  This will be 
followed by a discussion of landmark cases that have shaped the field in the United States 
and corresponding legislature.  This presentation of the history, law and ethics related to 
the management of the vulnerable neonate in the United States continues to demonstrate 
a dissonance between clinical practice, fashioned mainly by physicians, and the law 
which continues to eschew a best interests standard.  What remains unresolved is a 
standard method of determining such interests and protecting them.
Infanticide, abandonment, and overlaying
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While the medical, ethical, and social grounds for abandonment of critically ill 
newborns have changed drastically, the practice in the West has spanned from antiquity 
to the present day.  Societies as different as ancient Greece, classical Rome, Renaissance 
Italy, and Western Europe have had infanticide as part of their moral landscape and have 
displayed inconsistent legal patterns in dealing with the problem of child destruction or 
abandonment. In ancient Athens the major issue determining whether an infant lived or 
died was normalcy, and many philosophers advocated infanticidal practices.  In The 
Republic Plato even promoted killing apparently normal products of “inferior” parents, 
writing:
The proper officers will take the offspring of the good parents 
to the pen or fold, and there they will deposit them with certain 
nurses who dwell in a separate quarter; but the offspring of the 
inferior, or of the better when they chance to be deformed, will be 
put away in some mysterious, unknown place, as they should be 
(2).
Aristotle reaffirmed the notion of normalcy and created an explicit distinction between 
infanticide on the grounds of normalcy versus excess:
As to the exposure and rearing of children, let there be a law 
that no deformed child shall live, but that on the ground of an 
excess in the number of children, if the established customs of the 
state forbid this (for in our state population has a limit), no child is 
to be exposed, but when couples have children in excess, let 
abortion be procured before sense and life have begun…(3)
The insertion of a proposed threshold for abortion is interesting as it suggests that taking 
the life of a human after “sense and life have begun” would be morally unacceptable.  
However, there is no hesitation with the killing of “deformed” infants, implying their 
innate inhumanness and lack of value.
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Such attitudes towards impaired newborns persisted in classical Rome, where 
while Roman law provided awesome punishment for anyone who hastened the death of a 
relative, the murder of a child by the father was exempted.  Such exemptions often 
applied to the murders of girls or deformed newborns.  In fact, killing “defective” 
newborns was such common practice it became a common feature of medical works.  For 
example, Soranus of Ephesus had a section in his gynecological manual entitled “How to 
Recognize the Newborn that Is Worth Rearing.”  He cited such conditions as the health of 
the mother, pregnancy carried to term, proper cry, and perfection “in all its parts, 
members, and senses,”(4).
For the Romans such infanticidal practices were supported by two fundamental 
reasons.  Firstly, patria potestas, the father’s absolute legal authority over members of his 
family, as exemplified by the exception to the criminal code.  Secondly, it was considered 
the most reasonable course of action in the case of deformed or weak infants.  This was 
compared to the slaying of a diseased animal as defended by Seneca in the first century:
Mad dogs we knock on the head; the fierce and savage ox we 
slay; sickly sheep we put to the knife to keep them from infecting 
the flock; unnatural progeny we destroy; we drown even children 
who at birth are weak and abnormal. Yet it is not anger, but reason 
that separates the harmful from the sound (5).
With the coming of Christianity and the belief that all human life is sacred, came 
a backlash against infanticide.  The Didache, which established a code of Christian 
conduct in the early second century, specifically opposed both abortion and infanticide 
and early Christian writers including Tertullian, Lactantius, and Philo vehemently 
opposed infanticide.  With this fervent opposition against the killing of an infant came 
gradual revision of Roman law.  Ultimately in 374 the direct killing of an infant for any 
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reason was declared an act of homicide punishable by death (6).  Despite strict 
enforcement of the law, the disparity between religious and legal proclamations and 
parental practices persisted.  It was in this new moral and legal landscape that there 
developed a new distinction between active and passive measures.  Accidental 
“overlaying” of the infant by the parents or suffocation by bedclothes became a common 
occurrence incurring a penance of at least one year .  Furthermore, while intentional 
infanticide was a crime punishable by violent death, abandonment was acceptable, as it 
was perceived a less serious action given the remote possibility that the child would be 
saved.  Notably, in rare circumstances when exposed children were rescued, they were 
often reared for slavery or prostitution (6).  In the Middle Ages infant abandonment “was 
practiced on a gigantic scale with absolute impunity, noticed by writers with the most 
frigid indifference and, at least in the case of destitute parents, considered a very venial 
offense,”(7).
Widespread acts of infanticide directed toward illegitimate, unwanted, or 
defective children lead to the institutionalization of abandonment in Renaissance Italy.  
This occurred in two forms: foundling hospitals mainly for illegitimate males and care by 
a balia (lethal wet nurse) in the case of defective or female infants.  The foundling 
hospitals, often run by religious officials, were meant to be a haven for unwanted 
children.  However, they eventually became so overcrowded that children commonly 
died of neglect or inadequate medical care.  As William Silverman wrote, “This merely 
changed the time and the site of child deaths,” (8).  The balie on the other hand, took 
infants into the countryside and while apparently feeding them, killed them by either 
poisoning or suffocation.  In return for payment by the parents, the balie helped rid them 
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of all legal and ecclesiastical problems associated with the death of their unwanted 
infants (9).
Such practices continued on throughout Europe during most of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries.  Infanticide became especially common in England, where 
separation from the Church of Rome provided even more leniency, and eventually 
reached America.  While “killer nurses” continued to quietly poison unwanted children; 
neonates, bastards, and anomalous children were regarded as “changelings” and their 
deaths were necessary to protect parents from being labeled as accomplices of the devil.  
As Robert Weir describes:
Physically deformed and mentally retarded infants were also 
regarded as subhuman parasites who, if fed, sucked “whitened 
blood” (milk) from the mother’s breast at every feeding.  In 
addition, illegitimate infants and seriously deformed infants fell 
outside the category of “freemen” in medieval England, as 
evidenced by legal commentary of the time (10).
Infanticide continued to be rampant and a survey of British press in the 1860’s 
revealed frequent reports of dead infants found under bridges, in parks, culverts, ditches,
and cesspools (11).  As the crime became increasingly visible and troublesome, 
physicians including William Ryan and John Curgeven took a more active role and 
founded the Infant Protection Society.  Their efforts led to the passage of the first Infant 
Life Protection Act in 1872.  Public opinion, however, was more forgiving and English 
juries were reluctant to convict mothers.  The attitudes of the British may be best 
evidenced in the statement of one witness, “You cannot estimate the loss to the child 
itself, you know nothing about it at all. With regard to the public it causes no alarm, 
because it is a crime which can be committed only by mothers upon their newly born 
children,” (12).  
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In America accidental “overlaying” was most the most prominent form of 
infanticide and over time became increasingly uncommon for two reasons.  Initially, the 
Puritan concept of sin significantly influenced attitudes, as child destruction was 
perceived a violation of “God’s law.”  Furthermore, in the United States the law has 
never distinguished between infanticide and homicide, treating them both as equal under 
individual state penal codes.  As a result infanticide and exposure became increasingly 
rare; however, medical advances created a new issue: selective nontreatment.
New technologies, new dilemmas
The development of the modern neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) can be 
attributed partly to the Franco-Prussian War between 1870-71.  The immense loss of life 
both from violence as well as months of famine following the war created a new interest 
in more “feeble” neonates.  French obstetricians and nurses applied miniature versions of 
technologies such as feeding tubes and ventilators, previously used for comatose patients, 
to premature infants.  Additionally, the development of incubators helped prevent what 
were previously regarded as “expectant losses.”  Around this same time English 
physicians began adopting the new French methods in an effort to combat the steady fall 
of the birthrate.  In an article published in The Lancet in 1902, one physician argued to 
conserve the lives of all infants, “even the prematurely born… for economic as well as 
sentimental reasons,” (13).
As more critically ill newborns were sustained, new problems arose including 
recurrent waves of infection.  To lower this risk, glass-enclosed hospital units were 
created to isolate the susceptible babies.  Highly skilled nurses maintained nearly sterile 
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environments, even limiting physical contact between parents and their fragile babies.  
While such measures preserved the life of these previously nonviable infants, they also 
served to socially and emotionally isolate them from their families.  This echoed the 
historic sentiments of parental detachment and perception of premature or defective 
neonates as aliens.  Such attitudes allowed for the spread of Incubator Baby Exhibits at 
fairs and amusement areas such as Coney Island.  The “changelings” of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries had become the sideshows of the twentieth.  As late as the 1939 
World’s Fair in New York premature and deformed infants were displayed for the 
curious and paying public.  Parents often willingly accepted such arrangements and as 
William Silverman, often considered the father of neonatal intensive care, observed, 
“They were often too accepting, for many quickly lost interest in their children, and there 
was some difficulty in convincing them to assume parental responsibilities when the time 
came to send the fattened babies home,” (14).
The initial premature infant nurseries proliferating in large American hospitals 
around this time maintained similar boundaries.  Parents observed their babies from a 
distance through glass, physicians were discouraged from touching their patients too 
frequently, and often skilled and scrubbed nurses were the only caretakers growing 
attached to the survivors.  As life-support techniques for neonates became more effective 
and pediatric surgery more successful throughout the 1960’s, the premature infant 
nurseries developed into the new neonatal intensive care units.  The NICUs fostered 
physical and emotional bonding between parents and previously nonviable babies; 
however, many parents remained frightened and apprehensive.  This was especially true 
in the case of very small or less-than-perfect babies.  As Silverman describes:
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The smaller the infant and the more serious the imperfection, 
the more common were the mixed feelings about survival.  I was 
painfully aware that parental reactions were strongly influenced by 
my words and those of the nurses, and that nonverbal 
communication – not only from the caretakers but from the 
impressive physical setting and the awesome life-support 
machinery – played a significant role in determining how the 
parents expressed their feelings about this crisis in their lives (15).
It was in this manner that the NICU became the preeminent setting for life-and-
death decisions about premature and congenitally anomalous infants.  While parents 
made the majority of these decisions, it was the physicians’ perspectives that served as 
the grounds for decisions regarding selective nontreatment. The literature produced by 
pediatricians and pediatric surgeons during that period demonstrates disagreement not 
only on standard medical practice in caring for critically ill newborns, but also on the 
ethical and clinical criteria for selective nontreatment.
In 1973 Duff and  Campbell, two Yale pediatricians, were among the first to 
publish their experiences with foregoing treatment for 43 impaired infants.  Over a period 
of two and half years they described 299 deaths in the special-care nursery, 43 
attributable to withholding treatment from children with conditions such as trisomy 21, 
meningomyelocele, short-bowel syndrome, and other cardiopulmonary and central 
nervous system disorders.  In support of these decisions Duff and Campbell draw upon 
the notions of “right to die” and “wrongful life,” writing:
…Individuals should have a right to die in some circumstances 
such as anencephaly, hydranencephaly, and some severely 
deforming and incapacitating conditions.  Such very defective 
individuals were considered to have little or no hope of achieving 
meaningful “humanhood.”  For example, they have little or no 
capacity to love or be loved. They are often cared for in facilities 
that have been characterized as ‘hardly more than dying bins,’ an 
assessment with which, in our experience, knowledgeable parents 
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(those who visited chronic-care facilities for placement of their 
children) agreed (16).    
Duff and Campbell restrained from proposing rigid criteria for treatment and 
nontreatment decisions, concluding that decisions should be made “instance by instance” 
by the responsible parties involved.
Anthony Shaw, a pediatric surgeon and proponent of selective nontreatment, 
proposed mental retardation and/or severe physical malformation as important criteria in 
decision-making.  He drew upon the quality-of-life argument in support of his criteria and 
even proposed a quantitative formula: QL = NE x (H+S), quality of life equals an 
individual’s natural physical and intellectual endowment times the contributions made to 
the individual by family and society.  Applying this formula to certain clinical situations 
would indicate that an anencephalic infant has no quality of life because it lacks natural 
endowment.  In the case of an infant with Down’s syndrome however, the child’s limited 
natural endowments would be modified by home life and society.  Shaw acknowledged 
limitations of this criterion in borderline cases, yet maintained such predictions are 
necessary in decision-making (17).
John Lorber proposed another set of criteria for selective nontreatment: clinical 
criteria applying specifically to infants with spina bifida cystica.  Lorber based his criteria 
on a study of 524 infants and used them to distinguish between infants with milder forms 
who had the prospect of meaningful life, as he defined it, and those whose severe forms 
would cause unnecessary suffering.  He set forth six valuable prognostic criteria 
including the degree of paralysis, head circumference, the presence of kyphosis or 
scoliosis, associated gross congenital anomalies, intracerebral birth injury, and 
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thoracolumbar lesions.  Lorber justified his criteria on the basis of nonmaleficence, 
stating:
In spite of the most energetic treatment over half of such 
infants [those with severe cases of spina bifida] died, often after 
years and a long succession of operations.  The survivors continue 
with an unending succession of operations; most will remain 
incontinent with chronic pyelonephritis or hydronephritis and 
severely paralyzed, many will develop severe kyphosis, scoliosis 
and lordosis, and pathological fractures, more than a few will 
ultimately present the sequelae of hydrocephalus, especially fits 
(18).
Given the technical nature of Lorber’s criteria, physicians would be primarily responsible 
for decisions not to treat, as parents rarely disagreed with physicians’ advice against 
treatment.  Applying these criteria to his own practice, Lorber reported that over a 21-
month period 25 of 37 infants with spina bifida were not treated.  All of the untreated 
infants died within 9 months, only one treated infant died, and the rest were reported to 
be normal or only moderately handicapped.  Based on these results he concluded that 
selective nontreatment is “the best but not a good solution to an insoluble problem,” (19).
Despite Lorber’s apparent “success,” John Freeman, a pediatric neurologist at 
Johns Hopkins School of Medicine, publicly opposed Lorber’s policy of selective 
nontreatment.  Freeman argued that while untreated cases of spina bifida do not survive 
beyond the first year, they do not die quickly and “euthanasia might be the most humane 
course…but it is illegal.”  Given the dilemma between legal but inhumane nontreatment 
and humane but illegal euthanasia, he stated, “in an ambivalent fashion, I feel that 
virtually every child should be given optimal, vigorous therapy,” (20).  He included the 
qualifier “virtually” to allow for exceptional cases such as that of a paraplegic child with 
multiple anomalies from whom he elected to withhold treatment.  Clearly, what both 
14
these approaches lack is what constitutes a meaningful life for a disabled child who has 
known no other life, and who can decide this, morally or legally, without oversight or 
accountability?
These obvious points were recognized by pediatrician Norman Fost and lawyer 
John Robertson. They added a new legal perspective to the discussion of selective 
nontreatment.  In 1976 (prior to any formal legislation on the care of infants) they 
authored an article that suggested that parents and physicians engaging in selective 
nontreatment are potentially liable for charges of murder, manslaughter, child abuse, 
neglect, and conspiracy.  Given the legal ramifications of such crimes they suggest 
establishment of clear universal decision-making criteria and a standard procedural 
mechanism.  Fost also questioned pediatricians’ prognostic capabilities as well as their 
criteria for judgment.  He suggests that in recommending treatment decisions to families, 
physicians often project their own views about life and suffering:
The author would certainly not choose to spend his life in a 
wheelchair or with an ileal loop, but that does not mean that an 
infant or child, who never knew another life, need necessarily be 
psychologically overwhelmed by the experience (21).
Fost also challenged the inconsistencies in decision-making under the current lack of 
standards in which individual physicians choose to forego treatment for treatable 
conditions.  In addition to his legal arguments, Fost opened a new discussion on the 
extent to which physicians may justifiably interfere with parental discretion.  He 
suggested that in the situation of a child “whose prospects for a happy life are blocked 
only by a parental wish or preference,” physicians must intervene (22).  Despite his 
outspokenness on the issue of passive euthanasia, Fost still reserved the option for 
children with conditions such as anencephaly or trisomy 18.
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C. Everret Koop, however, was steadfast about his belief in “the sanctity of all 
life, born or unborn.”  Prior to his appointment as Surgeon General of the United States 
and his work towards The Baby Doe Rules, which will be discussed later, Koop was a 
distinguished pediatric surgeon committed to preserving the sanctity of life.  Koop 
accused pediatricians such as Duff and Campbell of infanticide and questioned both their 
ethical and medical judgment.  Like Fost, he questioned accuracy of diagnosis of lethal 
lesions and advocated for surgical correction except in terminal cases.  He also criticized 
the notion of protecting parents from having burdens they are unable to bear by ending 
the life of a handicapped infant.  He furthers this argument by suggesting that if factors 
justifying selective nontreatment include family stability, socioeconomic status, and 
social standing, then it is “clear that there has been introduced a discrimination just as 
deplorable as those of race, creed, or color,” (23).  It would be ten years before Koop’s 
argument eventually became the basis for legislation.
The NICU makes it to Primetime
In 1971 the ethical issues surrounding critically ill newborns reached the public 
with the production of the film “Who Should Die?” by the Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr. 
Foundation.  The film was a dramatization of the death of an infant with Down syndrome 
as a result of the parents’ decision to forgo surgical correction for duodenal atresia.  The 
production was the driven by two cases of infants with Down syndrome and duodenal 
atresia that took place at Johns Hopkins Hospital during the preceding years.  While 
surgical correction for duodenal atresia had been well accepted since the 1950’s, children 
with Down syndrome were still viewed as having very poor outcomes both medically and 
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socially.  The first baby was born to Roman Catholic parents who already had two older 
children.  In an interview with the infant’s pediatrician, the parents’ feelings were 
summarized:
…I remember very well the mother saying, I can’t remember 
the words but the implication was that there was no way that she 
would take the baby home.  That it would be so traumatizing to her 
personally and the whole family and so disruptive that she simply 
didn’t want to sign the operative permit.  She would rather have 
the baby die and end it all than to undertake caretaking of a 
severely handicapped baby (24).
Robert Cooke, Chairman of the Department of Pediatrics at the time, was disturbed by 
the parents’ and physicians’ decisions but was limited in his ability to intervene.  Cooke 
even informally consulted Emory Niles, retired Chief Judge of the Supreme Bench of 
Baltimore City, who told Cooke that the court would not intervene if this case were 
brought before it (25).
The second case involved the Jewish parents of an infant with Down syndrome: a 
nurse at the hospital where the child was delivered and a lawyer.  At first the parents were 
uncertain about the surgery and it was postponed.  Upon formal diagnosis of Down 
syndrome the parents decided against surgery and all feedings were held until the child 
died at 13 days of age.  J. Alex Haller, Jr., the attending surgeon, recalled that, “the 
parents believed that their child’s condition was God’s will and that they would not 
interfere with His plan,” (26).
Cooke was again constrained in his ability to intervene as the baby was under the surgical 
service.  Consequently, when the Kennedy Foundation began preparing for an 
international Symposium on Human Rights, Retardation, and Research, Cooke was eager 
to bring the case into the public forum.  The result was the production of “Who Should 
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Survive?: Choices on Our Conscience,” dramatizing the events surrounding the second 
Hopkins case from the perspective of the second year resident involved.  In the film the 
parents’ faces are never shown and they never speak.  Following the screening of the film 
at the symposium, it was previewed for the media and quickly became the subject of 
national media coverage.  Readers from across the country responded in letters to the 
editor and directly to some of the physicians involved.  While a small number of 
responders sympathized with the parents, the majority were critical of the parents’ 
decision, some even made general appeals to the law.  As a result, a debate that had been 
taking place in NICU’s for years finally entered living rooms across America and 
everyone had an opinion.
The Right to life itself: The case of Baby Houle
The battle over treatment of imperiled newborns finally reached courtrooms in 
1974 concerning the case of Baby Boy Houle.  Born at the Maine Medical Center, Baby 
Houle had multiple deformities: an absent left eye, a rudimentary left ear with no ear 
canal, a malformed left thumb, unfused vertebrae, and a tracheoesophageal fistula.  The 
infant also suffered seizures and was suspected to have an unknown measure of brain 
damage.  The Houles refused to consent to surgical repair of the fistula that would allow 
for proper feeding and respirations.  Several physicians involved in the case, together 
with hospital administration disagreed with the parents’ decision to withhold treatment.  
The hospital initiated a medical neglect case and petitioned the court for permission to 
perform the surgery.  Judge David Roberts did not hesitate in issuing an order for 
treatment.  In his judgment he stated:
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…At the moment of live birth there does exist a human being 
entitled to the fullest protection of the law.  The most basic right 
enjoyed by every human being is the right to life itself… The issue 
before the court is not the prospective quality of life to be 
preserved, but the medical feasibility of the proposed treatment 
compared with the almost certain risk of death should treatment be 
withheld.  Being satisfied that corrective surgery is medically 
necessary and medically feasible, the court finds that the 
defendants herein have no right to withhold such treatment and that 
to do so constitutes neglect in the legal sense (27).
Judge Roberts disregarded the arguments concerning quality of life, given that it was 
beyond the scope of a doctor’s expertise to make such judgments.  Baby Houle 
underwent surgical repair for his fistula with consent by a court appointed guardian.  He 
died the following day.
Conspiracy to commit murder: The Mueller conjoined twins
On May 6, 1981, conjoined twins Jeff and Scott Mueller were born sharing a 
single trunk below the waist and three legs.  Their parents, Pam, a registered nurse, and 
Robert, an emergency room physician agreed with their family physician not to 
resuscitate the twins.   Although the twins began to breathe spontaneously following 
birth, the attending physician and parents still believed the prognosis remained severe.  
They decided to withhold  care and a note was entered into the chart, “Do not feed in 
accordance with the parents’ wishes.”  The decision was met with skepticism by several 
staff members at the hospital and some nurses surreptitiously fed the boys small amounts 
of sugar and water.  
When the twins were eight days old, an anonymous caller told the Illinois 
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) that they were being neglected.  
Within hours a social worker investigated the case and concluded there was reasonable 
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evidence of neglect reporting, “I saw their ribs sticking out - which indicated to me that 
they had not been fed,” (28).  The twins were transferred to Lakeview Medical Center 
under temporary court custody and DCFS filed a petition of neglect against the parents.  
Several nurses testified at the hearing both for and against the Muellers.  Notably, they 
only agreed to testify after being granted a waiver of immunity from any possible 
criminal charges.  At the June 5 custody hearing, Judge John P. Meyer upheld the state’s 
contentions that the twins had been denied food, water, and medical care and granted 
temporary custody to the state.  Judge Meyer did not comment on the issue of neglect on 
the part of the parents and even sympathized with them.  In an interview with The New 
York Times in which he was frequently choking back tears, he said, ''There's no doubt in 
my mind that all the parties involved thought they were doing the right thing.  But when 
we put ourselves above the law, we cause nothing but heartache for our friends and for 
ourselves,'' (29).  Nevertheless, against the wishes of the parents, Jeff and Scott were 
moved again to Children’s Memorial Hospital in Chicago for evaluation and treatment.
On June 11 Danville prosecutor Edward Litak brought criminal charges against 
the parents and Dr. Warren.  All three pleaded not guilty to the charges of conspiracy to 
commit murder and endangering the life and health of infants.  This was the first time in 
US history that criminal charges had ever been brought against parents or doctors for 
withholding food or treatment from an infant.  During the preliminary hearing nurses who 
had previously come forth were unwilling to testify and implicate the parents.  As a 
result, Judge Richard Schott dismissed the criminal charges secondary to insufficient 
evidence to establish probable cause.  Prosecutor Edward Litak continued his case against 
the Muellers until April of 1982 when a Vermilion County grand jury refused to indict 
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the parents and their doctor.  All criminal records were subsequently ordered closed; 
however, Jeff and Scott remained in state custody.
After four months in DCFS custody, the twins were returned to their parents’ 
home, but DCFS maintained legal guardianship.  At the time of discharge, surgeons felt 
separation of the twins was nearly impossible and they were expected to live only a few 
weeks longer.   The twins, however, did not cooperate with this prognosis, which may not 
have been evidence based, and after one year they were steadily gaining weight and 
healthier than ever. Everybody covering the case attributed the twins’ success to the love 
and dedication of their parents rather than questioning the validity of the original 
prognosis.  One author wrote:
The devotion Bob and Pam Mueller gave their sons, at great 
financial and emotional cost to themselves, unmasks [the myth that 
parents who opt for nontreatment are selfish].  To characterize 
them as abusive parents is both false and cruel (30).
 In May of 1982 full custody of the twins was re-granted to their parents who just one 
year earlier had been facing criminal charges. Given the twins remarkable progress, 
surgeons decided it was safe to separate Jeff and Scott in a grueling nine-hour operation.  
Scott, who had congenital heart disease, died in 1985 at the age of 3.  Jeff continued to do 
well and later entered regular school. Whether such sacrifice surgery was reasonable has 
been questioned by authors such as Dreger and Miller (31).  
Families regain control: The case of Baby Doe
The infant known only as “Baby Doe” lived only six days, however his life and 
death changed the face of American neonatology.  He was born on April 9, 1982 in 
Bloomington, Indiana and was immediately diagnosed with Down syndrome and a 
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tracheoesophageal fistula.  By this time, surgical repair had a 90 percent success rate and 
mortality rates associated with all types of esophageal atresia had dropped from 100 
percent in 1945 to nearly 10 percent in 1982 (32).  The referring obstetrician, Walter 
Owens, consulted with the parents and emphasized the poor prognosis for a child with 
Down syndrome.  He suggested that “some people with Down syndrome are ‘mere blobs’ 
and that the ‘lifetime cost’ or caring for a child with Down syndrome would ‘almost 
surely be close to $1 million’,” (33). It is uncertain where the obstetrician obtained these 
figures, how they compared with the cost of raising a child with life long disability but 
normal cognition, or even the cost of raising any child.  The parents decided against the 
surgery and chose to keep the child in Bloomington where he would eventually die.  
Hospital administration and pediatricians involved in the case disagreed with this 
decision and immediately consulted Monroe County judge, John Baker.  At an 
unrecorded hearing that took place late at night in the hospital Owens ruled in favor of 
the parents and allowed Baby Doe to remain in Bloomington without surgery.
Three days later Monroe County Prosecutors Barry Brown and Philip Hill filed an 
emergency petition for custody of the child.  The appeal was denied by the county circuit 
court and again the following day by the Indiana Supreme Court.  In a final effort, the 
prosecutors traveled to Washington DC to appeal to US Supreme Court Justice Paul 
Stevens on April15.  Infant Doe died that day before the district attorney even arrived in 
Washington.  The events surrounding the case were so highly publicized that three 
couples initiated attempts to adopt Infant Doe and the prosecutors were encouraged to 
consider bringing criminal charges against the parents and Dr. Owen.  In explaining his 
decision not to pursue criminal charges Brown stated:
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The parents and physician were proceeding under a ruling of 
the Monroe Circuit Court, and therefore, under the color of law. 
None of the traditional purposes for invoking the criminal sanction 
– deterrence, punishment, rehabilitation – are applicable in this 
case.  We can find no theory of criminal law, which would justify 
placing the parents or the physician in criminal jeopardy.  We also 
believe that the pursuit of criminal action in this case would only 
compound the tragedy (34).
Ultimately, during his short life Infant Doe reversed the precedent set by the previous 
cases of Baby Houle and the Mueller twins; however, his true impact on legislation was 
yet to come.
Baby Doe on Capitol Hill
The Reagan Administration responded to the events surrounding the Baby Doe 
case almost immediately.  Surgeon General C.  Everett Koop, a strong opponent of both 
selective nontreatment and abortion, encouraged President Reagan to take strong action.  
In a memo dated April 30, 1982, the President instructed Richard Schweiker, Secretary of 
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), to notify health care providers that 
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act “forbids recipients of federal funds from 
withholding from handicapped citizens, simply because they are handicapped, any benefit 
or services that would ordinarily be provided to persons without handicaps,” (35).  Passed 
in 1973, the Rehabilitation Act protected handicapped adults and children from 
discrimination.  This new interpretation by the Justice Department identified impaired 
newborns as handicapped citizens and as recipients of federal funds such as Medicare and 
Medicaid, hospitals were forbidden from denying treatment on the basis of handicap.  
On May 18, 1982, HHS issued a “Notice to Health Care Providers” regarding 
“Discriminating Against the Handicapped by Withholding Treatment or Nourishment.”  
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Written by the director of the HHS Office for Civil Rights, the notice referred to the 
Infant Doe case and stated:
It is unlawful for a recipient of Federal financial assistance to 
withhold from a handicapped infant nutritional sustenance or 
medical or surgical treatment required to correct a life-threatening 
condition, if:
1. the withholding is based on the fact that the infant is 
handicapped; and
2. the handicap does no render the treatment or nutritional 
sustenance medically contraindicated.
While the notice recognized the limitations of its application to parental decision making, 
it warned hospital administrators to follow guidelines to avoid “facilitating discriminatory 
conduct,” (36).  In response to the notice the American Hospital Association issued a 
formal statement denying that “hospitals have in any way been guilty of discrimination” 
and promising to “make every effort to assure that such simplistic solutions to complex 
situations involving health care delivery are avoided,” (37).  The American Academy of 
Pediatrics also issued an official opinion opposing strict universal requirements:
The effort of the executive branch to solve this complex 
problem through strict interpretation and enforcement of the letter 
of section 504 may have the unintended effect of requiring 
treatment that is not in the best interest of handicapped children… 
It will frequently be the case that the use of a specific technology 
or procedures will not be in the best interest of the handicapped 
person.  Withholding a medical treatment will frequently be both 
legally and ethically justified in our efforts to do what is right for 
these patients (38).
Despite resistance from hospitals and physicians, on March 2, 1983, the Reagan 
administration added an “interim rule” in efforts to follow-up on the prior regulation with 
more force.  Coincidentally, this was issued the same week the film “Who Should 
Survive?” was aired for public audiences as a television series.  The new notice mandated 
posting of warning signs in delivery wards, pediatric wards, nurseries, and NICUs.  It 
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read, “Discriminatory failure to feed and care for handicapped infants in this facility is 
prohibited by federal law…Failure to feed and care for infants may also violate the 
criminal and civil laws of your state.” (Image 1)  Anyone witnessing such “abuse” was 
encouraged to report it through the toll-free hotline and HHS officials were given 
authority to take “immediate remedial action.”    Furthermore, hospitals were required to 
provide access to the hospital and its records to agency investigators, also known as 
“Baby Doe squads.”  Composed of lawyers, government administrators, and physicians, 
the squads were designed to access all hospital information in an effort to investigate 
complaints.  While publication of proposed rules must normally be followed by a thirty-
day comment period, HHS argued that the requirement was unnecessary in this case.  
They maintained that the access and medical records requirements were “minor technical 
changes necessary to meet emergency situations.”  Furthermore they argued that “any 
delay would leave lives at risk and for even a single infant to die due to lack of adequate 
notice and complaint procedure is unacceptable.”  The regulations were to become 
effective March 22, 1983 (39).
In response to the proposed regulations the American Academy of Pediatrics, the 
National Association of Children’s Hospitals, and Children’s Hospital National Medical 
Center filed a lawsuit against HHS and new Secretary, Margaret Heckler, to enjoin the 
interim final rule.  US District Court Judge Gerhard Gesell denied a temporary restraining 
order, but granted expedited review and agreed to hear the case on April 8.  Judge Gesell 
ruled that the HHS interim rule was invalid on procedural grounds because affected 
parties were denied the normal length of time to comment on it.  He took his judgment
further, questioning the utility of the anonymous hotline: 
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…The sudden descent of Baby Doe squads on the scene, 
monopolizing physician and nurse time and making hospital charts 
and records unavailable during treatment, can hardly be presumed 
to produce higher quality care for the infant.
He also criticized the failure to explore alternative means of preventing discriminatory 
denial of food or treatment as well as the absence of definition of “customary medical 
care.”  Without such a definition he found the regulation to be “virtually without meaning 
beyond its intrinsic in terrorem effect.”  Furthermore, he questioned the constitutionality 
of the rule stating, “To the extent the regulation is read to eliminate the role of the 
infant’s parents in choosing an appropriate course of medical treatment, its application 
may in some cases infringe upon [right to privacy interests].  Judge Gesell concluded that 
the regulation was “arbitrary and capricious” and the hotline rule was “hasty” and “ill-
considered.” (40).
On July 5 1983, after losing an appeal to keep the regulations in effect, HHS 
proposed a new rule, similar to the one issued in March, but explaining that federal law 
does not require the imposition of futile therapies to prolong the dying of a baby who is 
"born terminally ill." Of the approximately 17,000 comments received during the ninety-
day comment period, 97.5% favored the rule.  The Baby Doe Rules would see several 
more revisions and another landmark case before realizing their final form.  In the 
meantime, the efficacy of the regulations remained questionable.  From March 17 to
April 14 1983, the hotline received 600 calls.  While the majority were requests for 
posters or information, twenty percent were wrong numbers or hung up.  Of the sixteen 
calls making specific allegations, only five merited investigation without any further 
action (41).  Another study discovered that Baby Doe squads forced additional treatment 
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for six infants, however in none of these cases were they able to prove a violation of the 
regulations (42).
On January 12, 1984, the Department of Health and Human Services published 
the final rule on procedures and guidelines relating to nondiscrimination of handicapped 
newborns.  Effective February13, 1984, it included four main provisions:
1. Hospitals are encouraged to establish infant care review 
committees.
2. Informational notices regarding the legal rights of handicapped 
infants are to be posted.
3. Child protective service agencies are required to establish 
procedures for applying their own State laws protecting children 
from medical neglect.
4. Hospitals are to provide expedited access to records and expedited 
action to affect compliance when HHS officials determine that 
immediate access is necessary to protect the life or health of 
handicapped infant. (43)
No access for the Federal Government: Baby Jane Doe
As the Baby Doe Rules continued to be revised, a child known as Baby Jane Doe 
was born in Long Island on October 11, 1983.  She was born to middle-class parents, 
Linda and Dan, who had been married less than one year.  She suffered from spina bifida 
with meningomyelocele, hydrocephalus, a damaged kidney, and microcephaly, and was 
immediately transferred to the NICU at University Hospital at the State University of 
New York at Stony Brook.  The attending surgeon, Arjen Kenscamp, recommended 
emergency spinal closure and shunt placement to drain the hydrocephalus in an attempt 
to minimize developmental retardation.  George Newman, the pediatric neurologist, 
advised the parents against surgery given Baby Jane’s inevitably poor outcome.  As he 
later stated, Newman felt that, “the child was not likely ever to achieve any meaningful 
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interaction with her environment, nor ever achieve any interpersonal relationships, the 
very qualities which we consider human,” (44).   The parents, wanting to avoid 
“extraordinary” measures chose to forgo surgery and they requested comfort care 
including food, fluids, and antibiotics.
Despite the expectation that Baby Jane would soon die with her spinal cord open 
and increasing intracranial pressure, four days later she was still alive.  The story quickly 
made it to the news and Newsday reporter Kathleen Kerr published an exclusive 
interview with the parents.  Dan and Linda’s distress was clear:
Each time he began a sentence, Mr. A. let out a deep sigh, as 
though seeking strength to answer.  Mrs. A continually touched her 
husband’s arm and rubbed it soothingly.  Mr. A. shed his tears 
openly…Mr. A. said, “We feel the conservative method of 
treatment is going to do her as much good as if surgery were to be 
performed.  It’s not a case of our not caring.  We very much want 
this baby.”… “We’re not being neglectful, and we’re not relying 
on our religion [Catholicism] to give us the answer to what we’re 
doing here.”(45)
Physicians, nurses, and other staff at the hospital also sympathized with the parents and 
supported their decision.  A hospital social worker noted that Linda was determined to 
give Baby Jane “as much love as possible.”  In the era of the Baby Doe regulations, 
however, proponents of the right-to-life were eager to pursue the issue of handicapped 
newborns.  In this case Lawrence Washburn, a municipal-bonds lawyer from Vermont 
who promoted right-to-life organizations, received a confidential tip about Baby Jane 
Doe and filed suit in New York to obtain an order to have the surgery performed.  Given 
the death of Baby Doe during appeals, the case of Baby Jane Doe passed through the 
courts with unprecedented speed.
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Judge Melvyn Tanenbaum, who had accepted the Right-to-Life party nomination 
in November of 1982, presided over the case in an emergency hearing on October 20.   
As Washburn had no legal standing in the case, attorney William Weber was appointed 
as Baby Jane’s guardian ad litem.  Upon first speaking with the parents and Dr. Newman, 
Weber fully supported their decision; however upon reviewing the medical record, he 
reversed himself.  Two facts contradicted what Weber had previously been told.  First, 
Newman had written that after the surgery, Baby Jane would be able to walk with braces.  
Second, her chart said that the initial measurement of her skull was 31 centimeters, a 
value within normal limits and indicative of possible normal brain function (46).  Weber 
concluded that regarding the microcephaly, Newman had lied both during discussion with 
the parents and in his court testimony.  In court he argued for immediate surgery and 
Judge Tanenbaum authorized Weber to consent to the surgery.
The parents appealed the decision and the following day the county Appellate 
Division reversed judge Tanenbaum’s decision.  The court reasoned that the parents had 
chosen between two medically reasonable options as the proposed surgery carried 
significant risk as well.  Subsequently the New York Court of Appeals ruled that Judge 
Tanenbaum had abused his discretion in even hearing the case, as Washburn had “no 
disclosed relationship with the child, her parents, her family, or those treating her 
illness,” (47).  Furthermore the court dismissed the suit on procedural grounds because 
the allegation of child abuse and neglect had not been made to the state’s Department of 
Social Services for appropriate investigation.  While her case was making history in the 
courts, Baby Jane’s  wound naturally closed and she continued to survive. This was not 
necessarily and unexpected occurrence in untreated babies with open spina bifida.
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The government, however, had already begun to act following an anonymous 
complaint to the HHS hotline that Baby Jane Doe was being discriminatorily denied 
treatment.  HHS began a review of the medical record through October 19, which had 
become available during the state proceedings and Surgeon General Koop personally 
reviewed the case.  He concluded that he could not determine the basis for denial of 
treatment without “immediate access to, and careful review of, current medical records.”  
Despite a thorough investigation by the New York State Child Protective Services, which 
on November 7 concluded that there was no cause for state intervention, HHS initiated 
action to obtain the remainder of the medical record.  In response, Baby Jane’s parents 
said:
They’re not doctors, they’re not the parents, and they have no 
business in our lives right now… I just want [all this] to end.  Just 
to have a baby like this and deal with it is so much to go through 
right now.  Just let us be with our daughter and leave us alone… If 
there’s hell, we’ve been through it. (48)
Despite resistance from the hospital and the parents, HHS brought suit in US 
District Court to obtain the child’s medical records in an effort to conclude the section 
504 investigation.  Judge Leonard Wexler ruled that the hospital was not in violation of 
section 504 as the parents’ decision and not discrimination was the basis for forgoing 
surgery.  In support of the parents Wexler found their decision “reasonable” based on 
“the medical options available and on a genuine concern for the best interests of the 
child,” (49).  HHS appealed the decision, this time introducing a new argument 
questioning the responsibility of the hospital to intervene with the parents’ decision.  
HHS claimed that, “the requested records were necessary to determine whether the 
failure of the hospital to seek a state court order overriding the parents' decision and 
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compelling surgery was itself a violation of the nondiscrimination requirements of 
section 504.”  Furthermore, they argued that while the state court had already ruled that 
no discrimination had occurred, that was only on the basis of chart review through 
October 19 and as “medical decision-making is a dynamic process” there remained the 
possibility of discrimination at a later date.
The defendants, including the parents and University Hospital, argued against the 
application of section 504 to this case for two reasons.  First they questioned whether 
Medicare and Medicaid constitute “Federal financial assistance” as referred to by 504.  
Secondly they argued “congress did not intend that section 504 serve as the basis for 
federal intervention in medical decision-making.” Primarily the three-judge panel of the 
Court of Appeals determined that as a recipient of Medicare and Medicaid the hospital 
does fall under the statute of section 504.  They next addressed the central question in the 
case: “Did congress intend section 504 to reach the conduct HHS seeks to investigate?”
To answer this question the court first reviewed the history of HHS and its predecessor 
the US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW).  They noted that in 1976 
HEW adopted the position that 504 did not give it authority to regulate regarding 
patients’ rights to “receive or refuse treatment.”  The court found HHS’s current position 
on the scope of section 504 to be “flatly at odds with the position originally taken by 
HEW.”
The court was left to focus on the statutory language of section 504, which states:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United 
States, as defined in section 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by 
reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
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After determining that Baby Jane Doe does indeed fit the definition of a “handicapped 
individual” the court turned its attention to the application of the phrase “otherwise 
qualified” which they interpreted:
… Refers to a person who is qualified in spite of her handicap and 
that an institution is not required to disregard the disabilities of a 
handicapped applicant, provided the handicap is relevant to 
reasonable qualifications for acceptance, or to make substantial
modifications in its reasonable standards or program to 
accommodate handicapped individuals but may take an applicant's 
handicap into consideration, along with all other relevant factors, 
in determining whether she is qualified for admission.
They concluded that when the handicap itself is the subject of the service, as in the case 
of Baby Jane, section 504 does not apply.  Furthermore the Court of Appeals reinforced 
Congress’s consistent policy “against the involvement of federal personnel in medical 
treatment decisions” and found no difference in “the field of child care… which has 
traditionally been occupied by the states.”  On February 23, 1984, upon concluding that 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act did not give HHS authority to interfere with 
“treatment decisions involving defective newborn infants” the Court of Appeals decided 
2-1 to deny HHS’s request to obtain access to the medical record and continue its 
investigation (50).  The Justice Department subsequently filed and was denied a request 
with the Court of Appeals asking the entire twelve-member court to rehear the 
governments case.
In 1986, the case reached the United States Supreme Court with new HHS 
Secretary Otis Ray Bowen as the petitioner.  This time the defendants including the 
American Hospital Association challenged the validity of the Final Rules, which had 
been published after Baby Jane’s birth.  While there was disagreement among the Justices 
as to Baby Jane’s designation as an “other wise qualified handicapped individual, the 
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judgment held that “There is nothing in the administrative record documenting the 
Secretary’s belief that there exists ‘discriminatory withholding of medical care’ in 
violation of section 504 which would justify federal regulation.”  They went on to 
criticize the proposed complaint-handling process, stating “…state child protective 
service agencies are not field offices of HHS bureaucracy and they may not be 
conscripted against their will as foot soldiers in a federal crusade.”  While HHS can 
require state agencies to document their own compliance with section 504, the Supreme 
Court found no authorization for HHS to force state agencies to enforce compliance by 
other recipients of federal funds.  Finally, the decision invalidated the Final Rules on the 
grounds that HHS could not provide any evidence that discrimination against 
handicapped infants occurs:
Section 504 does not authorize the Secretary to give unsolicited 
advice either to parents, to hospitals, or to state officials who are 
faced with difficult treatment decisions concerning handicapped 
children. The administrative record demonstrates that the Secretary 
has asserted the authority to conduct on-site investigations, to 
inspect hospital records, and to participate in the decisional process 
in emergency cases in which there was no colorable basis for
believing that a violation of section 504 had occurred or was about 
to occur. These investigative actions are not authorized by section
504, and the regulations that purport to authorize a continuation of 
them are invalid. (51)
Essentially, the Supreme Court decision protected state law, which places qualified
consent and decision-making responsibility for the medical care of their children in the 
hands of parents.  The States also carry legislative responsibility for cases of child 
neglect. 
Amidst the continuing legal battle, Linda and Dan eventually changed their minds 
and permitted surgery to shunt and drain the hydrocephalus.  This decision was unknown 
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until months later.  Baby Jane was taken home by her parents on April 7, 1984, at age 5 
½ months.  The case continued to receive extensive media coverage, even becoming the 
focus of broadcasts by 60 Minutes and Face the Nation. For the most part the media and 
the public supported the parents and the hospital and C. Everett Koop was villainized as a 
fundamentalist Big Brother.  Baby Jane continued to do well and in a 1994 interview, the 
child known to the public only as Jane Doe was described:
Now a 10 year-old…Jane Doe is not only a self-aware little 
girl, who experiences and returns the love of her parents; she also 
attends a school for developmentally disabled children – once 
again proving that medicine is an art, not a science, and clinical 
decision making is best left in the clinic, to those who will have to 
live with the decision being made (52).
Let’s compromise: The Child Abuse Amendments
As the battle over Baby Jane Doe continued in courtrooms, Congress began an 
effort to end the political controversy over the federal role in decisions to withhold 
treatment from handicapped newborns.  New rules were developed as a result of 
negotiations among physicians’ organizations, hospital associations, right-to-life groups, 
and advocates for people with disabilities.  These came in the form of Child Abuse 
Amendments (CAA) of 1984 to the Child Abuse Protection Act of 1974.  The new 
category of medical neglect was added and stated:
1. All such disabled infants must under all circumstances receive
appropriate nutrition, hydration, and medication.
2. All such disabled infants must be given medically indicated
treatment.
3. There are three exceptions to the requirement that all disabled
infants must receive treatment, or stated in other terms, three
circumstances in which treatment is not considered "medically
indicated." These circumstances are:
a. If the infant is chronically and irreversibly comatose.
b. If the provision of such treatment would merely prolong 
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dying, not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all of the 
infant’s life-threatening conditions, or otherwise be futile in 
terms of the survival of the infant.
c. If the provision of such treatment would be virtually futile in 
  terms of the survival of the infant, and the treatment itself under 
such circumstances would be inhumane.
4. The physician’s "reasonable medical judgment" concerning the 
medically indicated treatment must be one that would be made by a 
reasonably prudent physician, knowledgeable about the case and 
the treatment possibilities with respect to the medical conditions 
involved. It is not to be based on subjective "quality of life" or 
other abstract concepts.
The guidelines came with a commentary providing definitions and further interpretation 
of ambiguous terms such as “virtually futile,” defined as “highly unlikely to prevent 
death in the near future on the basis of reasonable medical judgment.”  The CAA 
restricted the involvement of the federal government in individual cases of medical 
neglect and obligated states to set up procedures for responding to cases of medical 
neglect in order to continue receiving child abuse funds.  Regulatory and legislative 
action became the responsibility of the states. (53)
Right-to-life and disability groups were appeased because the provisions 
prohibited nontreatment decisions based on expected low quality of life or the interests of 
parents.  Physicians and hospitals, on the other hand, were protected because CAA 
imposed no legal duties on doctors.  For example, it would not be a federal crime for a 
doctor, parent, or hospital not to treat a child who did not meet the narrow expectations.  
Nevertheless, the CAA were perceived as creating a legal presumption in favor of more 
aggressive treatment.  Physicians and hospitals became more reluctant to defer to parental 
wishes.  As a result, multiple studies over the next few years demonstrated what many 
perceived as overtreatment by physicians due to the rules (54).  Both the American 
Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) and the American Medical Association, which had both 
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fought the previous Baby Doe rules, issued policies in support of equal treatment of 
newborns regardless of disability and low quality of life.  They also recommended the 
establishment of “infant care review committees,” the predecessors to ethics committees 
now found in many institutions.  In 1996 the AAP published a policy statement on 
“Ethics and the Care of Critically Ill Infants and Children.”  Their recommendations 
were:
1. Decisions about critical care for newborns, infants, and 
children should be made similarly and with informed parental 
permission.
2. Physicians should recommend the provision or forgoing of 
critical care services based on the projected benefits and 
burdens of treatment, recognizing that parents may perceive 
and value these benefits and burdens differently from medical 
professionals. 
3. Decisions to forgo critical care services on the grounds of 
resource limitations, generally speaking, are not clinical 
decisions, and physicians should avoid such “bedside 
rationing.” (55)
Since then, the states have played a passive role, intervening only under extreme 
circumstances or when hospital ethics committees cannot resolve conflicts between 
parents and care providers.  In the twenty years since the passage of the Baby Doe 
regulations, the states’ reactions in these instances has been conflicting as will be 
demonstrated in the discussion of cases that follow.
Parents seize control: Sammy Linares and Baby Messenger
In 1998 a case in Illinois truly tested the law.  Sammy Linares, a six-month-old 
boy was at a birthday party when his five-year-old sister handed him a rubber balloon, 
which he inhaled, causing asphyxiation and cardiac arrest.  By the time he arrived at the 
emergency room Sammy had been without oxygen for nearly twenty minutes.  There he
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was resuscitated and maintained on a ventilator prior to transfer to the PICU at Rush-
Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Medical Center.  Despite the doctors’ predictions that Sammy 
would survive no longer than 24 hours, four days later he remained alive in what his 
doctors described as a “persistent vegetative state.”  His father, Rodolfo, requested 
termination of life sustaining interventions; however, the hospital, unsure of the legal 
ramifications, resisted.  As his physician, Gilbert Goldman later stated, “There was no 
ethical difference of opinion here. The physicians agreed that the child was in an 
irreversible coma and would not recover. There was no medical opposition to removing 
the ventilator. What we faced was a legal obstacle.”  At the time, Illinois law did permit 
withdrawal of life support mechanisms from patients with absent brain activity; however, 
there was no precedent governing those with minimal brain activity, even in the absence 
of any prospect of regaining consciousness.  Chief hospital attorney Max Brown advised 
the medical staff not to remove the life support for the Linares child.  Brown supported 
his decision stating, “There is an absence in the law. I told the medical staff there was a 
possibility they would face criminal charges. I can't speculate with the careers of doctors 
and nurses,” (56).  Sammy remained on life support and eventually the hospital initiated 
transfer to an extended care facility.
The hospital had advised Mr. Linares and his wife, Tammy, to seek a court order 
authorizing the removal of the respirator.  However, the Linareses, a family living on 
welfare, felt limited by their financial constraints.  After four months Mr. Linares, 
desperate to end the saga, attempted to disconnect Sammy’s ventilator but was restrained 
by hospital staff as it was reconnected.  Four months later Mr. Linares tried again, this 
time keeping hospital staff at bay with a handgun, and succeeded.  After holding his son 
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and sobbing for twenty minutes, Mr. Linares turned himself over to the police.  He was 
charged with murder, but the grand jury refused to issue an indictment for homicide.  
Sympathy for Mr. Linares was universal.  Robert Stein, the medical examiner ruled that 
the death was “accidental” and declared the primary cause of death asphyxiation by 
balloon (57). 
In response to the Linares case, the Illinois Governor signed the Health Care 
Surrogate Act into law in 1991.  The act allowed surrogate decision makers to withdraw 
life sustaining treatment from any patient lacking “decisional capacity” as long as the 
patient met one of the following “qualifying conditions”:
1. Terminal condition in which, “there is no reasonable prospect of cure or 
recovery, death is imminent, and the application of life-sustaining treatment 
would only prolong the dying process.”
2. Permanent unconsciousness “for which initiating or continuing life-sustaining 
treatment, in light of the patient's medical condition, provides only minimal 
medical benefit.”
3. Incurable or irreversible condition “ that ultimately will cause the patient's 
death even if life-sustaining treatment is initiated or continued.”
The act required certification in writing in the patient's medical record by the attending 
physician and by at least one other qualified physician. The law remained mindful of the 
CAA and in the case of neonates specified “Nothing in this Act supersedes the provisions 
of 45 C.F.R. 1340.15 concerning the provision of ‘appropriate’ nutrition, hydration, and 
medication for neonates.” (58)
Another case in Michigan demonstrated a similar outcome.  In 1994 Baby 
38
Messenger was born at 25 weeks and weighing 750 grams.  In consultation with the 
attending neonatologist, the parents had been told there was a 50-75% chance of 
mortality and a 20-40% chance of severe intraventricular hemorrhage and subsequently 
requested that no “extraordinary” measures be taken during the resuscitation.  The 
neonatologist was not present at the birth and a physician assistant resuscitated the infant 
who was later admitted to the NICU in poor condition.  The parents requested withdrawal 
of treatment and refused to consent to surfactant administration.  The physician assistant 
responded that she was unable to terminate care and by the time the neonatologist 
arrived, the baby had somewhat stabilized and the physician wanted to continue care.  
Once the parents were alone with the baby, the father disconnected the ventilator as the 
mother held the dying baby.  The father was charged with manslaughter, but the jury 
believed that parental choice was in the child’s best interest and found him not guilty 
(59).  
These cases demonstrate a clear shift in attitudes since the days of Baby Doe just 
ten years earlier.  Baby Doe’s parents who had merely refused to consent to surgery were 
criticized across the country.  However, these two fathers, who in essence committed 
infanticide, received sympathy and support from the public.  The general consensus once 
again became that parents have a child’s best interest at heart and should retain all 
decision-making authority.  Actual practice among NICU’s in America became 
incongruous.  A 1991 New York Times survey found that two programs in the same New 
York county had completely different attitudes toward treatment in marginal cases; one 
treating aggressively, the other deferring to parental wishes (60).  Similar disparities were 
found in many other studies as well.
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The price of a wrongful life: Sidney Miller
On August 17, 1990 Karla Miller was admitted to the Woman’s Hospital of Texas 
with chorionamionitis and preterm later.  The baby was estimated to be at 23 weeks
gestational age and weigh approximately 630 grams.  Both the attending obstetrician and 
neonatologist informed the Millers that “the infant had little chance of being born alive,” 
and even if it were, it would suffer “severe impairments, including cerebral palsy, brain 
hemorrhage, blindness, lung disease, and mental retardation.”  The Millers requested that 
“no heroic measures” be performed and their requests were documented in the medical 
chart.  Later that day, the obstetrician convened with hospital administrators and other 
physicians and determined that, according to unwritten hospital policy, if the fetus was 
born alive and weighed over 500 grams, the hospital was obligated to resuscitate.  Mark 
Miller, the father, refused to consent to immediate resuscitation and it was decided that a 
neonatologist would be present at the birth to evaluate the infant and decide to resuscitate 
based on her condition at birth.  Mark later denied that he had agreed to this plan (61).
Sidney Miller was born later that night at 23 weeks and one day, weighing 615 
grams and with Apgar scores of three and six and one and five minutes respectively.  She 
was resuscitated, intubated, received surfactant, and was transferred to the NICU with 
central lines in place.  According to hospital records, Mark Miller signed consents for 
administration of Vitamin E, surfactant, and a blood transfusion within the first two hours 
of life.  Four days after birth Sidney suffered a Grade III/IV intraventricular hemorrhage.  
The Millers later consented to surgical cutdowns to replace ruptured access vessels as 
well as surgical placement of a ventricular shunt to relieve her hydrocephalus.  After two 
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months in the NICU, Sidney was transferred to Texas Children’s Hospital, and at age six-
months she was released to her parents’ home.  
At the age of seven, Sidney could not walk, talk, feed herself, or sit up on her 
own. She was legally blind, had mental retardation, cerebral palsy, seizures, and spastic 
quadriparesis in her limbs. She could not be toilet trained and required several shunt 
revisions to relieve her hydrocephalus.  She needed care twenty-four hours a day.  
Around this time the parents sued the Hospital Corporation of America (HCA), but not 
the physicians, for battery and negligence in treating Sidney without consent and seeking 
compensation for her “wrongful life.”  The parents alleged “vicarious liability for the 
actions of the hospital in… treating Sidney without consent [and] having a policy which 
mandated the resuscitation of newborn infants weighing over 500 grams even in the 
absence of parental consent.”  Furthermore, they asserted that HCA was directly liable 
for “failing to have policies to prevent such treatment,” (62).  In January 1998 a jury 
under the 189th District Court In Harris County found HCA liable, and awarded the 
Millers $29,400,000 in past and future medical expenses, $13,500,000 in exemplary 
damages, and $17,503,066 in prejudgment interest.  
However, on appeal in December 2000 a two-to-one- split reversed the decision 
and rendered a take-nothing judgment against the Millers.  The district court had based its 
judgment on the Texas Natural Death Act, which allowed parents to forego life-
sustaining treatment in children with terminal or irreversible conditions.  The appellate 
court referred to the application of The Act, stating:
The Legislature has expressly given parents a right to withhold 
medical treatment, urgently needed or not, for a child whose 
medical condition is certifiably terminal, but it has not extended 
that right to the parents of children with non-terminal impairments, 
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deformities, or disabilities, regardless of their severity. 
The court held that because Sidney’s condition was not certified as terminal, the Millers 
did not have the statutory right to refuse life-sustaining treatment.  The judgment also 
focused on the state’s interest in preserving life, referring to Texas Family Code section 
151.002, “a child born alive after a premature birth . . . is entitled to the same rights as are 
granted by the State to any other child born alive after normal gestation.”  The appellate 
court acknowledged that a compelling argument can be made that the law should make an 
exception for a baby who is “born so prematurely and in such poor condition that 
sustaining [the baby’s] life, even if medically possible, cannot be justified.”  However, as 
no present legislature indicated which nonterminal conditions would qualify, the court 
could not classify Sidney’s case as an exception.  The appellate court held that as long as 
a baby’s medical condition is not certified as terminal, medical professionals have no 
duty to follow a parent’s directive “to withhold urgently needed life sustaining medical 
treatment” from a baby.  Furthermore, the appellate court found that no court order was
necessary to override the Millers’ refusal of life-sustaining treatment because the need for 
life-sustaining treatment actually became urgent while the nonterminally ill baby was 
under the care of the medical providers. (63)
The Millers appealed to the Texas Supreme Court, asserting battery and negligence 
claims for the medical treatment provided to Sidney without parental consent.  In 2003 
the court issued an opinion affirming the appellate court decision that Sidney did not 
meet the conditions of the Natural Death Act.  Furthermore, they agreed that treatment 
without parental consent in this case did not constitute battery and that given the urgency, 
no court order was necessary.  The court found that Sidney’s medical treatment was
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provided “under emergent circumstances as a matter of law” and that “those 
circumstances provide[d] an exception to the general rule imposing liability on a 
physician for providing treatment to a minor child without first obtaining parental
consent,” (64).  HCA was accordingly absolved of all liability.  Perhaps what was more 
notable about the Supreme Court’s decision was what it did not say.  They denied the 
wrongful life cause of action (which have all other courts), and did not address quality of 
life concerns or best interest standards. But it is important to note that although the 
child’s eventual neurological status was poor, such severity is not the rule for surviving 
extremely preterm infants.
Epilogue
Some might argue that the outcomes of the Miller case highlight the inadequacy of 
current legislation and the impracticality of rigid legislation.  While the right to life and 
the autonomy of the family have become widely accepted into current practice neither is 
an absolute.  The roles of wrongful life and quality of life remain unclear.  Discerning a 
wrongful life is a legal imponderable as it requires comparing an undesirable life against 
no life.  This is a reason why a wrongful life suit is yet to be successful.  Requiring the 
courts to balance the benefits and burdens of a condition when these are uncertain is also 
difficult.  Accordingly, US courts have favored preserving life except when the outcome 
is clear and well delineated. The legal and legislative history of neonatal decision-making 
establishes and protects the role of parents as primary decision-makers.  In doing so, we 
place the responsibility of protecting a child’s best interests into the hands of the parents.  
This does not however give families the unregulated right to determine which children 
43
are preferable and which are simply a burden.  As Geoffrey Miller suggests, “Society has 
to trust parents and physicians to provide care for children, up to a point.  Where to draw 
the boundary is open to discussion, but not that there should be a boundary,” (65).  
Current Federal law protects physicians and hospitals from criminal consequences, but 
does not clarify boundaries, beyond the CAA.  State laws are explicit in cases of terminal 
and incurable infants, but fail to establish guidelines in more ambiguous cases.  The 
failure of most of the previous legislation on this matter is likely attributable to the 
attempt to address all situations with a single set of rules.  Perhaps the best approach may 
be one proposed by Duff and Campbell: instance by instance.  However, such a model
risks the dangers of ignorance, hubris, and prejudice.  Ethics committees can be the 
foundation for such decision-making as this might prevent the individual beliefs of 
physicians from obscuring the interests of the family and the child. However, given their
variable composition and nature and their susceptibility to “group think,” ethics 
committees cannot replace statutory legal boundaries. Morality and law remain related, 
but they are not the same. Both can evolve or regress, and not necessarily in the same 
directions, depending on times and circumstance.
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